Abstract. In the Rabin cryptosystem there are four different decryption results for each ciphertext. Thus, extra complexity is required on decryption to identify which of the four possible decryption results is the true plaintext. We propose a modification of the Rabin cryptosystem based on cubic residues. Let p and q be primes, N pq  . The sender Bob computes ciphertext 3 (mod ) c m N  to Alice, where m is a confidential message. Alice decrypts the ciphertext c by the proposed method in this paper and gets the only one plaintext m . The proposed cryptosystem is provably secure against a chosen plaintext attack if and only if the integer factorization problem is hard.
Introduction
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman proposed the best known public-key cryptosystem which is called the RSA cryptosystem [1] . The RSA is the first practical realization of public-key cryptography based on the notion of one-way trapdoor function which Diffie and Hellman imaged [2] [3] . It is not known if the RSA problem is equivalent to the integer factorization problem. Rabin proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on the difficulty of computing a square root modulo a composite integer [4] . Rabin's work has a theoretic importance. It provided the first provable security for public-key cryptosystems, that is, the security of the Rabin cryptosystem is exactly the intractability of the integer factorization problem. The encryption algorithm in the Rabin cryptosystem is also extremely efficient and hence is very suitable in certain applications such as encryption performed by hand-held devices. However, we also know that for each ciphertext, there are four different decryption results. In general, there will be no way to distinguish which of these four possible plaintexts is the "right" plaintext, unless the plaintext contains sufficient redundancy to eliminate three of these four possible values. In [5] , a novel method to compute a cubic root of a cubic residue was given. Then signature schemes based on cubic residues were proposed. If one selects proper parameters, the computational efficiency of constructing a cubic residue is better than constructing a quadratic residue. In this paper we propose a modification of the Rabin cryptosystem based on cubic residues. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief review of the Rabin Cryptosystem. In Section 3, a modification of the Rabin cryptosystem based on cubic residues is proposed. Section 4 gives security analysis. Section 5 compares the proposed cryptosystem with the Rabin Cryptosystem. Finally, summary is given in Section 6. then N pq  is a so-called Blum integer. In this case it is easier to compute square roots modulo p and q , and therefore to obtain four square roots modulo N by applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In real application of the Rabin cryptosystem, the plaintext should contain additional information for the receiver to pinpoint the correct decryption result.
Brief Review of the Rabin Cryptosystem

A Modification of the Rabin Cryptosystem Based on Cubic Residues
We first give some preliminary results on cubic residues.  . This contradicts the assumed intractability of the integer factorization problem.
Theorem 3. The proposed cryptosystem based on cubic residues is completely insecure against a chosen ciphertext attack.
Proof. Suppose an adversary wants to know the plaintext of a ciphertext 3 (mod ) c m N  which he has eavesdropped or intercepted from a confidential communication between Alice and someone else. He picks a random number r , where 1 
